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Abstract.  
The Knowledge Based View of organizational development is based on Transaction Cost 
Economics involving minimizing internal transaction costs (‘friction’). One source of friction 
is "self-interest seeking with guile" in management. Friction raises internal costs and 
Management Control (in the sense of the control of management) introduces checks and 
balances to limit extensive "guile", but control mechanisms themselves incur costs and 
ideally the costs for control should not exceed the costs of the friction, however 
quantitative measurements are lacking. To obtain these values scientific methods, including 
control experiments, are needed but if such estimates occur in case studies then they are 
seldom and often oblique. Research in silicio is faster and cheaper than conventional 
approaches and several innovative laboratory alternatives exist in computer-generated 
realities. One computer model explains SME development and can predict outcomes of 
changes within organizations. This communication reports on the costs of combinations of 
“guileful” behaviour; departmental managers restricting knowledge flow between 
departments do contribute to lowering company performance, but this effect is small in the 
short term: One departmental manager blocking information flow reduced the financial 
performance organization-wide by 1.4% in the local department plus 1.2% in the remainder 
of the organization. Two such managers reduced overall performance by 4.1% and four such 
managers reduced overall performance by 6.4%. Guileful behaviour also added instability at 
size over 150 employees. 
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Introduction 
Transaction Cost Economics (also called Transaction Cost Theory) argues that to achieve 
rational profit maximisation, organizations must minimise their total costs, which in turn are 
made up of both production costs and transaction costs. Williamson (1985) as well as 
Williamson and Masten (1999) stress that transaction costs are as significant as production 
costs. Regarding transaction costs, the Knowledge Based View of the firm (for a recent 
review see Amadasun, 2014) underlines that a major factor contributing to transaction costs 
in an organization can be the costs of internal communication, also colloquially known as 
information gatekeeping: It is known that unhindered knowledge flow and the rapid 
dissemination of incremental innovations arising from this flow is especially important in 
SMEs (Desouza & Awazu, 2006. Serenko et al, 2007) and this aspect has been applied to 
studies on management control in SMEs (for some examples see e.g. Ditillo, 2004).  
In terms of management control, Williamson (1985) argues that "self-interest seeking with 
guile" (Williamson, 1985 p30, Williamson 1993, p97) is inherent in human behaviour and 
thus that it is difficult to identify trustworthy individuals in organizations, with the result 
that it is necessary for organizations to structure themselves with internal checks and 
balances in such a way as if individuals cannot be trusted and this ‘Management Control’ 
clearly adds a further layer to internal transaction costs. Against this background, thirty 
years of research has only yielded a general confirmation that "self-interest seeking with 
guile" raises internal costs and in particular quantitative measurements of this effect are 
noticeable by their absence. The rise of what is popularly called ‘the knowledge economy’ 
has placed more attention on trust as a modulator of transaction costs in organizational 
economics and management, indeed over 25 years ago Donaldson (1990) pointed out that 
lower transaction costs should be inherent in matrix organization structures exhibiting 
vertical dis-integration. But again this circles back to the question; how much? Clearly trust 
(if not misplaced) is cheaper than control mechanisms, but by the same token the control 
mechanisms that are put in place should not be more expensive than what lack of trust 
costs.  
Controversy exists as to the predominant role of middle managers within the organization: 
Some research, for example Kuratko et al. (2005) and Huy (2001) point to the role of middle 
managers in communicating information between operations and top-level management, 
developing tactical objectives, executing strategies and acting as important drivers of 
entrepreneurial initiatives within the organization. Other authors talk of the phenomena of 
‘silo building’ (see e.g. Foucault, 2002) or "counter effort" as Guth and Macmillan (1986, p 
313) succinctly put it. So while a transaction cost theory of management control is widely 
accepted (e.g. Spekle, 2001. Vosselman, 2002), middle managers may still not be entirely 
honest and truthful about their intentions, for example they might hinder the positive 
effects of Knowledge Management like having open information gateways or other internal 
communication pathways in order to ‘ring-fence’ or otherwise keep for themselves 
resources that are over-proportional to real or expected results, as seen on an organization-
wide scale.   
Through the lens of the Knowledge Based View, perfect Knowledge Management in an  
organization would involve having open information and communication pathways in order 
both to provoke ‘mutual inspiration’ amongst the workforce, and then to promote the 
spread of innovations  arising from e.g. ‘mutual inspiration’, rapidly within the organization. 
Departures from this (i.e. a form of friction) will result in companies incurring higher internal 
transaction costs, but again it has not hitherto been possible to put concrete financial value 
on this phenomenon which, by anecdote, unfortunately appears to be relatively common. 
Darroch (2005) reported that firms that manage their knowledge well actually do perform 
better. Furthermore Schmid and Kern (2014), in addition to providing an excellent overview 
of the literature, point out that in particular, improvements in information gatekeeping at 
middle management level do indeed lead to overall improvements, but again no data has 
been reported on what the absolute volume involved could be. There is a real paucity of 
research on the impact of ‘counter effort’ and indeed Wang and Murnighan (2011, p. 279) 
state “empirical research on greed is rare”. Much has been written on how leaders can 
stimulate innovation (e.g. de Jong & Den Hartog, 2007) but computer modelling allows us 
for the first time to investigate the converse. Therefore this communication reports the 
results obtained from modelling the economic impact that this ‘counter effort’ behaviour at 
departmental level has on small businesses.   
 
Previous Research 
An early theoretical framework for applying computer modelling to understanding business 
processes was proposed by Melão & Pidd (2000) and more particularly for business 
management processes by Pidd (2006). In more recent years the computer modelling of 
organizations has begun to make more practical advances: Yuan & McKelvey, (2004) used it 
to explore situated learning theory and McCarthy (2008) applied computer modelling to 
manufacturing strategies. More recently Keyhani et al (2015) successfully used Games 
Theory to model entrepreneurial processes in the marketplace. Perhaps more relevant, 
Mellor (2011 and 2014a) presented a 3D quantitative folded pseudo-Markov net that 
pertains to the knowledge-based theory of the firm and explains the growth stages of SMEs 
as observed in the classical SME literature (see e.g. Greiner 1972) via their knowledge assets 
(Boisot, 1998). The 3-dimensional computer model has also been used experimentally to 
predict outcomes associated with structural changes within organizations, and preliminary 
results that use the Knowledge Based View to model SMEs in service industries are very 
encouraging (Mellor, 2015b). The Mellor (2011) model has subsequently been developed 
and used for Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations (see e.g. Chib and Greenberg, 1996 for 
a classical review of Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques and Robinson, 2014, for a more 
recent overview) and this modelling revealed both the added value of financial returns upon 
adding innovators to middle management (Mellor, 2014b) as well as the financial value of 
adding “just in time knowledge” derived from external networks (Mellor, 2015a).  
Previous 3-dimensional simulations (see Mellor, 2011 and Mellor, 2014a) were performed 
under conditions where the model assumes that the organization grows in a relatively linear 
fashion and, through growth in number of employees, splits into departments of up to 50 
employees, splitting again in a binary fashion when this figure is exceeded and the resulting 
departments being joined together by a management layer of departmental managers who 
exhibit perfect open information gateways policies. However the computer simulation used 
is flexible and can be adapted, for example in this case by removing the information flow 
through the managerial information gateways between departments. Thus the results 
presented here report the situation where the departmental managers still lead 
departments of up to 50 individuals but are dysfunctional and impermeable regarding the 
flow of information, knowledge and innovation between departments.  
The Model and Approach 
The 3D virtual fold used is shown in Figure 1 and has previously been described in Mellor 
(2011) and in Mellor (2014a). Briefly the three dimensions are; (x) firm size as measured by 
number of employees because the number of employees is proportional to the possibility of 
successful recombination of knowledge to form innovation, and (y) value. Value in an 
organization can be measured in various ways, in Figure 1 the calculated profitability per 
employee is used but one could just as easily also use other indicators e.g. firm annual 
turnover – the amounts needed to support those employees – without significantly affecting 
the results. The third (z) axis represents openness to innovation on a benchmarked scale 
from 0 (zero resistance) to 10 (maximum resistance to change) within the relevant industry 
sector. This is in agreement with Melão & Pidd (2000) who specifically took business change 
into account in their models, albeit that they were more inclined to a Business Process 
Reengineering context. Within this Mellor (2011) 3D space (referred to as “knowledge 
valley”, Mellor 2014a) a peer-to-peer model was constructed where people in an 
organization are represented as nodes (the number of people being represented by the 
variable ‘P’, and are joined by ties. The number of links or ties between nodes is known as 
the Diversity Innovation (DI) number (Mellor, 2011) and as the DI number increases the 
potential for knowledge recombination into innovation and mutual inspiration also 
increases (Mellor, 2011). When two individuals enter into a communicative relationship, 
then a communication pathway (sometimes called a link or ‘tie’) opens, i.e. the DI number 
reaches the number 1. As long as the number of people involved is larger than 3, then the 
number of pathways is proportional to the number of people involved and this relationship 
can be expressed by a simple arithmetic equation (note that an asterisk, *, is the 
mathematical symbol for multiply):  
DI   =   P * [P-1] 
                              ------------ 
          2 
Using this equation the amount of potential DI (i.e. the potential for the generation of new 
and profitable ideas – the ‘mutual inspiration’ – see e.g. Belfo 2014) in an organization as it 
grows and acquires more employees can be calculated in a very convenient way. 
Unfortunately, widespread knowledge sharing and consequent recombination of diverse 
knowledge into useful innovation is however prevented in practice by the concomitant 
increase in internal transaction costs, which includes the time (and thus cost, for example as 
salary) taken for individuals to communicate. Furthermore as an organization grows, 
unfettered knowledge sharing is no longer possible because at around 50 employees, 
transaction costs force SMEs into a policy of departmentalization, and the effect of forming 
new departments is to reduce the DI number in periodic cycles in tact with each round of 
departmentalization (Mellor, 2011). The simple model used here assumes binary fission of 
the organization into departments of equal sizes as the organization grows in multiples of 50 
and forms a simple hierarchical structure within the organization with departmental leaders 
(middle managers) acting as channels between departments and in turn reporting to the 
CEO, however it must be stressed that actual values for any organization can be used. To 
use actual data from a case organization the key values on the X and Y-axes are thus number 
of employees (X axis) and some measure of financial performance (Y axis) whereas the Z axis 
would be a benchmarked scale of where an organization can be placed on a 1-10 scale, the 
maximum (10) being calculated using the DI equation for that organization. The three 
dimensional space of the model is occupied by a fold representing the fluctuating DI number 
with time and a J-curve which in turn uses values taken from the literature on Business 
Process Reengineering (Pidd, 2006; and for the actual values used see Mellor, 2011, table 
14.1 and for an at-length discussion of these, see Mellor 2011 and 2014a). Thus taking a 
low-innovation company as a starting point it is assumed that successfully transforming it 
into a high-innovation company will initially decrease its value but upon successful 
completion will approximately triple its value and profitability. Thus the 3D fold allows the 
benchmarked use of innovation to be plotted against projected financial performance 
starting from low-innovation organizations (the “Dickensian” side of the fold) on the left, to 
a high-innovation state (the “Schumpeterian” side of the fold) on the right; the inhabitants 
of the Schumpeterian side represent the “gazelles” of the sector (for illustrations of this 
effect, see Mellor, 2011).  
Modelling was carried out in Maple 18 (www.maplesoft.com).  
 
Analysis and Results 
The control simulation was run exactly as before (Mellor, 2011) with the exception that 
Maple 18 was used in place of Maple 14, which is now outmoded. The model referred to as 
above, when completed, results in the 3D fold shown in Figure 1A. The simulation was then 
run again and Figure 1B shows the results obtained when the simulation was repeated but 
with the connections between nascent departments severed, emulating dysfunctional and 
impermeable barriers regarding the flow of information, knowledge and innovation 
between departments. Each simulation was run ten times and the overall standard 
deviation (SD) observed was less than 0.01.  
  
  
Figure 1A and 1B: The 3D fold with open information gatekeepers (1A) as control 
simulation, and with blocked (‘counter effort’) information gatekeeping (1B). Both Figure 1A 
and Figure 1B exhibit dips at employee number 50 and 100 where rounds of 
departmentalization take place, but only 1B exhibits a further dip at further 
departmentalization (150 employees).   
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 The situation modelled in the case of closed information gates reveals two differences; a 
pronounced third ‘dip’ in the financial performance of the organization at around size 150 
employees and an overall lower performance during all growth phases above 50 employees. 
It is not clear why the closed information gates scenario involves a crisis at the third round 
of departmentalization, which is not so clear or even lacking in the open gatekeeping 
simulation, but one could speculate discord amongst uncommunicative managers affecting 
overall performance, a phenomenon which would not be found in the control experiment, 
which also showed a generally higher background performance which in turn could mask 
any negative effects in that scenario.  
At organization size over 50 employees, general financial performance was less in the 
simulation with closed information gates (Figure 1 B) than in the control simulation (Figure 1 
A). However at the peak of performance, the point where the most difference would be 
found, overall performance was down by a mere 6.4% (SD 0.05, n=10). As an across the 
board rule and subject to some variation (within the constraints given in real life like the 
vagrancies of exactly how poor the information gatekeeping is) then this percentage of 
financial under-performance will apply to organizations generally having four departments. 
Predictions for organizations with different number of departments may be derived from 
Table 1 (below).  
Using the model provided of linear growth, regular departmentalization and turnover 
covering costs and the data presented, the amount of actual value in annual turnover lost 
due to under-performance was calculated to range from £3.8 million per annum for very 
high value organizations (“gazelles”) of size 200+ employees down to £530.000 per annum 
for low value organizations of similar size. Clearly unlike percent values, these figures are 
not subject to generalizations and probably will not apply exactly to any existing 
organization. None the less, the actual amount for any particular organization will most 
probably fall within that range and furthermore can be relatively simply calculated by 
entering the specific data for that organization into the computer model and deriving a 
simulation.  
The 6.4% drop in annual performance observed was due to 4 information gatekeepers 
(middle managers as heads of the four newly formed departments) each being completely 
closed. It would be an extreme situation if all departmental heads in an otherwise high-
value, high-innovation environment refused to communicate with each other at all on what 
was happening within their respective departments, nonetheless it only represents an 
average of 1.5% drop in profits per gatekeeper per annum, so serious detrimental effects of 
departmental  leaders acting within the term "self-interest seeking with guile" or with other 
guileful fashion by restricting information gatekeeping, can reasonably only be expected to 
be significant and provoke remedial action after several years of this behaviour, e.g. building 
up to 15% after 10 years.    
In order to test the effects relating to departmentalization further, a scenario was adopted 
where not all four, but only two, departmental heads behaved in a guileful fashion. In this 
modelling any two departmental heads behave in guileful fashion but communication is 
unhindered between the others. The results were an overall decrease in performance of 
4.1% with a deviation from 10 repeats of 0.05. This figure was rather higher than expected 
because information can still reach all four departments by tricking through roundabout 
routes. Due to this seeming discrepancy the simulation was repeated with only one guileful 
manager; as before the model assumes that communication is unhindered between the 
non-guileful. The other assumptions in this particular scenario are; (a) leaders in a 
department cannot change with time i.e. the model does not deal with a mix of long-
established managers and new managers but all of a similar length of service, and (b) that 
no department is functionally dependent upon another i.e. there are knock-on effects 
related to e.g. production bottlenecks. The results are shown in table 1.  
  
  Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 
Department 1 A B B B 
Department 2 B A B B 
Department 3 B B A B 
Department 4 B B B A 
  
Table 1: Showing loss of performance in departments according to guileful behaviour at 
managerial level. These were e.g. Manager 1 of Department 1, or Manager 2 of Department 
2, etc. Results were found to belong to two categories (A and B) where category A was 
minus 1.4% with SD of 0.05 and category B was minus 0.4% with SD of 0.05. In all cases 
n=10.  
  
 The results summed up in Table 1 show that one departmental manager blocking 
information and knowledge flow to other departments reduced the financial performance 
of an organization by 1.4% in the local department and a further 1.2% spread across the 
remainder of the organization. Two such managers reduced overall performance by 4.1% 
and this should be seen in the light of the results from Figure 1 that four such managers of 
all four departments reduced overall performance by 6.4%. The situation of three 
departmental managers blocking information flow was not modelled because three 
withholding information from the fourth is functionally alike to all four blocking 
communication with each other.   
Discussion  
The simulations illustrated in this communication show the quantitative effects of a 
dysfunctional lack of information gatekeeping (non-communication with consequent 
restriction of diffusion of innovation) between departmental managers. This is not the only 
‘counter effort’ that can exist, but in this report other instances on a spectrum from Human 
Resources issues like neglecting duties, anti-social behaviour and bullying etc to actual 
criminal issues like fraud and embezzlement to outright stealing are not considered, rather 
left to internal or official investigation. Taken together, the results illustrated in this report 
do show without doubt that guileful information gatekeeping (‘counter effort’) at 
departmental manager level in SMEs is detrimental to overall organizational performance in 
two ways:  
1. Firstly the development of the organization is not smooth and modelling showed 
growth and performance to be significantly hindered at around size 150 employees, 
which perhaps indicates the consequences of managerial non-cooperation e.g. the 
departmental managers squabbling over the division of budget and assets as the 
organization grows from three departments to four departments.  
2. Secondly the overall financial performance of an organization is negatively affected. 
That said, the effect is relatively minor and it may in fact take several years for the 
effect to attain the magnitude needed to attract attention and provoke remedial 
action by the other stakeholders involved (e.g. the owner or CEO) especially because, 
as the word ‘guileful’ implies, the behaviour is artfully deceptive and thus probably 
not consistent.  In addition to this, not all effects may be immediately localized and 
thus point at the individual involved; one guileful manager attracted a deficit of 1.4% 
in their own department, but four times this is 5.6, not the 6.4 that all four acting 
together provoked, implying that the effects of ‘counter effort’ by one manager will 
be felt in several other departments so one may not immediately be able to locate 
the source of the friction.   
This is clearly of interest for the strategic aspects of management control and the 
management of SMEs generally, because it shows for the first time the cost ceiling for 
Management Control operations.  
The measurements taken in the modelling presented here took place at the highest point in 
order to have the largest possible measurable differences and thus the actual financial 
figures may well not be applicable to other organizations (although specific cases can be 
modelled as well), but the percent differences are very much applicable to both low-
innovation and high-innovation organizations of any size below 250 employees. It is worthy 
of note that while concrete data is not available, organizations with less than 200 employees 
but five or more departments can presumably and at a conservative estimate attain 6.4% 
losses (from Figure 1) plus a minimum of 1.4% (from Table 1) for every department above 
four; so the larger the number of departments and thus departmental managers, the larger 
the potential inefficiency. Nonetheless having non-communicative middle managers in high-
innovation environments does seem somewhat paradoxical and it is tempting to speculate 
that there may be fewer knock-on effects in high-innovation environments, in other words 
that a guileful manager that provokes larger losses by e.g. demotivating the workforce in 
their department may be more characteristic of low-innovation environments. This 
speculation is in line with the classical findings of Bracker and Pearson (1986) whose said it 
is “… the process, not the plan itself, (that) is a key component in performance.” (Bracker and 
Pearson, 1986, p312) as well as the more contemporary findings in a similar vein, e.g. 
Desouza & Awazu (2006, p32) who stress “Organizational knowledge is the most salient 
resource at the disposal of SMEs …  (and) … successful SMEs are those who can leverage 
their knowledge in an effective and efficient manner” which indeed would imply that 
‘counter effort’ may well act differentially in high- and in low-innovation environments.  
Transaction Cost Theory assumes that commercial organizations (firms, companies, etc) are 
profit maximising, and that profit maximisation involves costs minimisation. Furthermore it 
assumes rationality on the part of owners and also the middle managers. This is a dangerous 
assumption and may well be at variance with reality when considering the amount of 
literature mentioning the ‘counter effort’ (e.g. Foucault, 2002) behaviour exhibited by 
middle managers (see also Guth and Macmillan, 1986). Consider that in the 1970s, smaller 
companies were held up as being viable alternatives to larger companies, but the ‘happy 
ship’ scenario developed by Ingham (1979) and others has since been questioned by 
academics whose research included not only the managers, but also the managed (e.g. Ram, 
1994). This led to the ‘bleak house’ scenario, which is supported by Earnshaw, et al (2000) 
who used statistics from e.g. work tribunals for unfair dismissal etc. and generally exposed 
widespread poor employee relations, although Earnshaw, et al (2000) did not provide 
information about the innovation level of the “bleak house” companies involved.  
Conclusion 
SMEs are very important in the global economy and especially those in the growing service 
sector undergo a knowledge-based development that it is paramount to understand 
properly.  
These results confirm that the dissemination of incremental innovations is important in 
SMEs (Desouza & Awazu, 2006. Serenko et al, 2007) and confirms Darroch (2005) findings 
that firms that manage their knowledge well do perform better, and in particular the 
assertion of Schmid and Kern (2014) is supported in that improvements in information 
gatekeeping at middle management level do indeed lead to overall financial gains.  
Briefly; the 3D computer model has shown for the first time that the real transaction costs 
for poor knowledge management and guileful behaviour in the sense of blocking 
information gatekeeping and the spread of innovation in the organization can be up to 6.4% 
of overall annual financial performance and this figure represent the first quantitative 
estimation of the maximum costs for Management Control in SMEs.  
Anecdotally stories of poor departmental leadership abound and thus of interest to strategic 
knowledge management (and Business Consultants) is the question; what actual effect does 
the “bad boss” have on “the bottom line”? Here it is shown that in high-innovation 
environments these costs are not sufficiently high to attract much attention and attendant 
preventative measures in the short-term provided that the workforce in the department 
affected remains motivated and innovative. However, if the workforce attached to that 
departmental manager becomes demotivated – a scenario that may be more common in 
low-innovation work environments – then costs can be expected to increase significantly. 
Does this imply that bureaucratic controls on management are more justified and should be 
of higher magnitude when the organization involved is a low-innovation organization? 
Unfortunately it is beyond the present capacities of this computer model to anticipate these 
extra costs with any reasonable accuracy. In order to resolve this question, future work will 
be aimed at investigating this area further and will involve the modelling of actual case 
organizations, contrasting high-innovation with low-innovation organizations and 
organizations which contain various numbers of departments.  
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